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THE EXPANSION OF CHARITABLE
CHOICE, THE FAITH BASED INITIATIVE,
AND THE SUPREME COURT'S
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
JURISPRUDENCE
STEVEN FITZGERALD
During the 2000 Presidential Campaign, both Vice President
Al Gore and Texas Governor George W. Bush agreed that faith-
based organizations should play a greater role in government-
sponsored social welfare programs1 and the Bush Administration
made it a cornerstone of its domestic policy. 2 While the issue
may have come into vogue during the election, the Bush
Administration's "faith-based initiative"3 was born in the
Welfare Reform Act of 1996. 4 This Act created Charitable
I Albert R. Hunt, Faith-Based Efforts: The Promise and Limitations, WALL ST.
J., Aug. 12, 1999 at A23 ("Both Vice President Al Gore and Texas Gov. George W.
Bush have espoused greater reliance on church and community [based]
organizations to provide social services for the poor and infirm.").
2 See Rallying the Armies of Compassion at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/reports/text/faithbased.html (last checked Sept. 3,
2003) (explaining why faith-based organizations are often better suited to address
social welfare problems and how the administration intends to funnel resources to
them); see also John J. Dilulio Jr., Know Us by Our Works, WALL ST. J. Feb. 14,
2001 at A22 (the first head of the newly created Office of Faith-Based Initiatives
outlining some of the administration's goals); Maria Newman, Bush Visit Sets Off
Church-State Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2001 at B5 (reporting on President
Bush's visit to Episcopal Church administering the "Youth Entertainment
Academy," a group that received State funds after passage of Charitable choice.
Bush pointed to the program as a model for his faith-based initiative); David E.
Sanger, Bush Asks Mayors to Lobby For Faith-Based Social Aid, N.Y. TIMES, June
26, 2001 at A17 (reporting how Bush petitioned mayors to lobby Congress in
support of the Faith Based legislation while assuring separation of church and state
would remain).
3 See Mr. Bush's 'Faith Based'Agenda, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2001 at 10 (referring
to the administration's policy as "the 'faith based' initiative.").
4 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,
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Choice, 5 a provision giving faith-based organizations a right to
compete for public funding of their social welfare programs equal
to the funding enjoyed by public agencies and other non-
religiously affiliated organizations. 6 Before Charitable Choice,
distinctly separate organizations set up by religious institutions,
like Catholic Charities, were eligible for and received
government funds subsidizing their social welfare services. 7
Charitable Choice is unique because it does not require a
recipient to institutionally separate its social services from its
religious organization as long as federal funds are not used to
directly advance religion.8 Supporters of the provision point out
that the religious nature of these providers often makes them
more effective than traditional providers. 9 Opponents argue that
the provision is unconstitutional, 10 and some fear that the
program is merely an attempt to shift responsibility away from
the government and onto religious groups without a
corresponding transfer of funds.1'
Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified within various sections of 42 U.S.C. §
1305).
5 See 42 U.S.C. § 604a (2000); Symposium, Living With Privatization: At Work
and In the Community, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1397, 1412 (2001) (noting that
charitable choice was originally a provision within the Welfare Reform Act
sponsored by then Senator John Ashcroft) (hereinafter Living With Privatization).
6 See 42 U.S.C. 604a(c) ("[R]eligious organizations are eligible, on the same
basis as any other private organization, as contractors to provide assistance, or to
accept certificates, vouchers, or other forms of disbursement... neither the Federal
Government nor a State ... shall discriminate against an organization ... on the
basis that that organization has a religious character."); Living With Privatization,
supra note 5 at 1412 (noting that after passage of this provision religiously affiliated
social service providers could "compete... on equal footing with public agencies,
nonprofit organizations, and for-profit corporations.").
See Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291, 297 (1899) (holding that a hospital
administered by Catholic Church was not a religious body and that federal aid was
appropriate); Hunt, supra note 1 (reporting that two thirds of Catholic Charities'
funding comes from government sources).
8 Living With Privatization, supra note 5, at 1412 ("[F]aith based initiatives can
be explicitly religious, as long as ... public money is not directly supporting the
religious part of their services.").
9 See id. at 1413 ("Underlying this is the belief that the faith factor of religious
social services is what makes them more successful.").
10 Mr. Bush's 'Faith Based' Agenda, supra note 3 (expressing concern that
Charitable Choice will blur the lines between secular and impermissible religious
government funding).
11 See Elizabeth Becker, An American Cardinal Who Works to Help the World,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2001 at All ("Cardinal McCarrick said he would have told Mr.
Bush of his fear that the Government would get out of needed social assistance and
hand it over to religious groups."); Hunt, supra note 1 ("[T]hey stress, faith-based
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Neither the original incarnation of Charitable Choice nor
the President's expansion efforts have resulted in a great influx
of funding to faith-based social service providers. 12 Rather, they
have resulted in an outcry 13 from those who believe that even the
limited form of Charitable Choice already in place is a violation
of the Establishment Clause 14 and that President Bush's
expanded version will only make matters worse. Expansion of
Charitable Choice, contained in The Community Solutions Act of
2001,15 passed the U.S. House of Representatives in July 2001
and is considered a limited version of the Bush Administration's
proposal. 16 The Senate version of the bill, entitled Charity Aid,
Recovery, and Empowerment Act of 2002 (CARE Act), was
introduced into committee on February 8, 2002. 17 At this
initiatives have to supplement government efforts, rather than substitute or replace
them."); Newman, supra note 2 (noting that some think Republicans merely want
out of social services).
12 See Hunt, supra note 1 (noting that even faith based providers in Texas
during President Bush's term as Governor reported no real influx of funding for
these organizations after passage of Charitable Choice); Kim Cobb, Faith Groups
Wary of Bush Idea; Expense of Court Battles Could Offset Benefits of Federal Funds,
HOUST. CHRON., Feb. 11, 2001 at A22 (discussing the inherent pitfalls of federal
funding).
13 David J. Freedman, Note, Wielding the Ax of Neutrality: The Constitutional
Status of Charitable Choice in the Wake of Mitchell v. Helms, 35 U. RICH. L. REV.
313, 315 (2001) ("Charitable Choice violates the Establishment Clause."). See
Elizabeth Becker, Changes Open Door for Bill On Charities of Churches, N.Y.
TIMES, June 28, 2001, at A23 ("Republicans have so far failed to enlist the support
of many Democrats, largely because of constitutional issues."); Mr. Bush's 'Faith
Based'Agenda, supra note 3 ("[A]s currently drafted, the 'faith based' initiative still
raises concerns about possible violations of the separation between church and
state."); Newman, supra note 2 (quoting church members who felt the bill violated
separation of church and state); Patricia Rice, Faith-Based Programs Would Answer
Prayer, Backers Say; Others Worry That Bill Would Violate Separation of Church
and State; But Need For Help is Real, They Say, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 25,
2001, at A8 (explaining that while such a program is beneficial, it may unduly
lessen the divide between church and state).
14 U.S. CONST. Amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion.").
15 H.R. 7, 107th Cong. (2001) (referred in Senate July 19, 2001.
16 See Elizabeth Becker, Less For Charities, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2001, at A20
(noting that a scaled down version came out of committee).
17 S. 1924, 107th Congress (2002). The Senate version of the bill uses more
general language than the House version. In many respects it simply reiterates the
original charitable choice provision contained in 42 U.S.C. § 604(a). However, the
Bush Administration has expressed approval of it. See President Bush, Sen.
Lieberman Discuss Armies of Compassion, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02 (Sept. 2, 2003).
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writing, that is where it sits. 18
This Note will summarize the Supreme Court's
Establishment Clause jurisprudence as it pertains to the
expansion of Charitable Choice and the Faith-Based Initiative
and analyze its current application in the Second Circuit. It will
then show that Expansion of Charitable Choice 19 does not violate
the Establishment Clause and the Bush administration's wider
proposals could also be enacted without violence to the First
Amendment. However, potential constitutional and practical
dangers could arise, and this Note will suggest ways that policy
makers can avoid the pitfalls by providing safeguards for
religiously affiliated social service providers. Finally, this Note
will look at the issue from the affiliated organization's
perspective and offer some caveats.
I. THE LEMON-AGOSTINI TEST
Establishment Clause jurisprudence has undergone a
tremendous shift over the last decade and polarization on the
Supreme Court has made interpretation extremely difficult. 20
Given the political realities on the Court, if one had to
summarize this area of the law in one line it would be: "It's what
Justice O'Connor says it is." Perhaps this statement is an
18 This bill was doomed to languish in the Senate from the outset. See Elizabeth
Becker, Lieberman Joins Bush Bid To Push Aid-To-Charity Bill, N.Y. TIMES, July
21, 2001, at All (noting that Senate Majority Leader, Tom Daschle, was unlikely to
rush bill to floor because of "provisions that allow religious charities to hire only
members of their faith."). The attack on September 11, 2001 has certainly
aggravated this delay. The attack also has had a pronounced enlarging effect on the
Federal Government. Given the Bush administration's distaste for "big
government," Charitable Choice may be more important than ever. If the Federal
Government could reduce its role in providing welfare services, perhaps growth in
other areas of the government would seem less pronounced. However, some might
argue that September eleventh has taught us that charities are not necessarily
more efficient than traditional government providers.
19 Title II of The Community Solutions Act of 2001 is titled "Expansion of
Charitable Choice" H.R. 7, 107th Cong. (2001).
20 See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 804 (2000) (Justice Thomas notes in his
plurality opinion that "Establishment Clause jurisprudence has shifted in recent
times, while nevertheless retaining anomalies with which the lower courts have had
to struggle."); DeStefano v. Emergency Housing Group, Inc., 247 F.3d 397, 405 (2d
Cir. 2001) (noting that after a decade of polarization in this area "the governing law
remains in doubt.").
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oversimplification but it is how the lower courts are proceeding.21
This conclusion is inescapable after an analysis of the Justices'
votes in these cases: Justices Rehnquist, Thomas, Kennedy, and
Scalia vote together,22 favoring an almost complete departure
from previous Establishment Clause jurisprudence. 23 Justices
Souter, Stevens, and Ginsburg consistently join in dissent of that
view.24 Justice Breyer had been joining the dissenters 25 until
recently when he joined in Justice O'Connor's concurrence in
Mitchell v. Helms. 26 Therefore, Justice O'Connor holds the
deciding vote. 27 Her narrower view is, for all practical purposes,
the law in this area 28 and will likely continue to be until
membership on the Court changes.
In Agostini v. Felton,29 Justice O'Connor wrote for a five to
four majority. The Court was asked to reconsider a decision
made fifteen years earlier that resulted in a permanent
injunction barring public employees from entering parochial
schools 30  to provide remedial instruction.31  The Court
recognized, in light of the evolution of Establishment Clause
jurisprudence, the earlier decision was no longer good law. 32 To
bring some clarity into this area,33 the majority "modified"34 the
21 See DeStefano, 247 F.3d at 419 (stating that it would follow O'Connor's
concurring opinion in Mitchell rather than the plurality).
22 See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 801; Rosenberger v. Rector, 515 U.S. 819, 822
(1995).
23 See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 826 (Justice Thomas writing for the plurality, "that
period is one that the Court should regret, and it is thankfully long past."); see also
id. at 837 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[I]n my view, the plurality announces a rule
of unprecedented breadth.").
24 See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 867; Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 240 (1997);
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 863.
25 See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 822 (joining dissent). See Agostini, 521 U.S. at
240 (Breyer, J., joining in part of dissent).
26 See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 836.
27 See DeStefano, 247 F.3d at 418 (stating that ruling view in Mitchell is Justice
O'Connor's view).
28 See id. at 419 ("[W]e conclude that Justice O'Connor's opinion is narrower
than the plurality's.").
29 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
30 Although the central focus of this article is not aid to religiously affiliated
schools, it is impossible to discuss Establishment Clause jurisprudence without
reference to these cases. The religious school is also sufficiently analogous to the
religiously affiliated social welfare provider.
3' See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 208-09.
32 Id. at 209. (holding that the earlier decision was not consistent with
subsequent decisions)
33 See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 807 (Justice Thomas pointing out that Agostini
215
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criteria used to determine whether government aid to a
religiously affiliated organization violates the Establishment
Clause.3 5 After this, the previously applied Lemon test 36 is no
longer particularly relevant.3 7 The emerging test, referred to as
the Lemon-Agostini test,38 is now the proper starting point for an
analysis of whether government funding violates the
Establishment Clause.39
Under the Lemon-Agostini test, the first step is to determine
whether the statute in question has a secular purpose.40 If it
does, the next step is to determine "whether the aid has the
'effect' of advancing or inhibiting religion."41  In order to
determine whether the aid has an impermissible effect, the
Court looks to three criteria: (1) whether the aid results in
governmental indoctrination; (2) whether recipients of aid are
defined by reference to religion; and (3) whether the aid creates
an excessive entanglement between the government and
religion. 42 These same criteria are considered when determining
"brought some clarity").
34 Id.
35 Agostini, 521 U.S. at 234.
36 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (stating test under
which to determine whether a statute violates the Establishment Clause: (1) The
statute must have a secular purpose; (2) It must not have the primary effect of
advancing or inhibiting religion; (3) It must not result in excessive government
entanglement with religion).
37 See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 808 (Justice Thomas for the Plurality, "[Olur cases
discussing excessive entanglement had applied many of the same considerations as
had our cases discussing primary effect, and we therefore recast Lemon's
entanglement inquiry as simply one criterion relevant to determining a statute's
effect." (citing Agostini, 521 U.S. at 232-33)). But see Simmons-Harris v. Zelman,
234 F.3d 945, 952 (6th Cir. 2000) ("The Supreme Court has not overturned or
rescinded the Lemon test.").
38 DeStefano v. Emergency Housing Group, Inc., 247 F.3d 397, 413 (2d Cir.
2001).
39 See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 807 (explaining that Agostini brought clarity prior
case law); DeStefano, 247 F.3d at 405 (noting how the Second Circuit has continued
to apply the Lemon test as modified by Agostini).
40 Agostini, 521 U.S. 203, 222-23 ("[W]e continue to ask whether the
government acted with the purpose of advancing or inhibiting religion."). Among the
cases cited for this proposition was Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 593 (1988)
(holding that Adolescent Family Life Act was enacted for the secular purpose of
reducing teen pregnancies). See also Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 845 (O'Connor concurring)
(asking "whether the program results in governmental indoctrination or defines its
recipients by reference to religion.").
41 Agostini, 521 U.S. at 223. See Mitchell, 530 U.S. 845 (O'Connor, J.
concurring).
42 See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 234; see also Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 845 (O'Connor, J.
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whether aid constitutes an impermissible endorsement of
religion.43
To determine whether Congress acted with a valid secular
purpose, the Court generally looks to the problem the law meant
to address. 44 If that purpose was not to advance or inhibit
religion, it probably has a valid secular purpose. 45 The effect test
is more complex.
A. Governmental Indoctrination
The first prong of the Lemon-Agostini test asks whether the
program or law results in governmental indoctrination. 46
"[I]ndoctrinate means 'to instruct in a body of doctrine or
principles.... To imbue with a partisan or ideological point of
view."' 47  Any indoctrination must be attributable to the
government to amount to governmental indoctrination. 48
Agostini noted that prior cases had held that the mere presence
of a public employee in a sectarian environment was
governmental indoctrination because the employee might instill
religious tenets into students, either mistakenly or
intentionally.49  The cases also held that placing public
concurring).
43 See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 235 (stating that the same considerations apply in
determining whether the program can be viewed as an endorsement of religion); see
also Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 845 (O'Connor, J. concurring) ("[T]he same criteria could
be reviewed to determine whether a government-aid program constitutes an
endorsement of religion.").
44 See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 603-04 (noting that Congress passed
Adolescent Family Life Act not to endorse religion but to deal with teen pregnancy.
This was a valid secular purpose).
45 See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 222-23 ("[W]e continue to ask whether the
government acted with the purpose of advancing or inhibiting religion."). Agostini
involved Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 which
ultimately allowed public employees to provide remedial instruction to students in
parochial schools. Id. at 208-09. The purpose of this legislation was to provide equal
educational opportunity. Id. The Court noted that the previous disposition of the
case didn't turn on whether the program had a valid secular purpose, it turned on
whether monitoring the program in order to ensure that the aid was only applied for
that purpose would produce an excessive entanglement. Id. at 221.
46 See id. at 234.
47 DeStefano v. Emergency Housing Group, Inc., 247 F.3d 397, 414 (2d Cir.
2001) (quoting The American Heritage Dictionary).
48 Id. at 415 ("To hold otherwise would be to render superfluous the word
governmental' in this central and presumably carefully worded Lemon-Agostini
factor.").
49 See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 219 (citing Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 372
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employees in a sectarian environment created a symbolic union
between religion and government.50 Justice O'Connor found that
those cases were no longer good law.51 The Court will not
presume that "public employees will inculcate religion simply
because they happen to be in a sectarian environment."52
Likewise, there is no longer a presumption that simply placing a
public employee in a sectarian environment results in "a
symbolic union between government and religion."53 The Court
went on to say that the once held view that symbolic union
prevents any and all forms of government aid to religious
institutions for secular purposes has been expressly rejected.5 4
Since there is no presumption that symbolic union results in
governmental indoctrination, the analysis turns on whether
governmental aid subsidized the recipient's religious mission. 55
Reading Agostini and Mitchell56 together, it is possible to discern
some general principles helpful for navigating these areas.
First, if a religious institution is "pervasively sectarian,"57
government funds should not reach their coffers 58 since, at least
(1975) (overruled in part by Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (discussing how
the presences of teachers could instill certain religious beliefs)), Wolman v. Walter,
433 U.S. 229, 248 (1977) (overruled in part by Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793
(2000) (holding that therapeutic and remedial services on non-school property does
not impermissible effect freedom of religion).
50 See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 220 (citing Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312
(1952)).
51 See id. at 222 (holding that recent cases have altered the assumptions on
which the prior cases relied upon).
52 Id. at 234.
53 Id. at 223 (citing Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School Dist., 509 U.S. 1
(1993)).
54 Agostini, 521 U.S. at 225 (citing Witters v. Washington Dept. of Servs. For
Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986) ("[W]e have departed from the rule relied on... that all
government aid that directly assists the educational function of religious schools is
invalid.").
55 See id. at 227 (rejecting the assumption that Title I teachers in parochial
school would create a symbolic union).
6 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
57 This term of art is discussed more fully below.
58 See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 839 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that a central
principle in cases where aid was upheld to pervasively sectarian institutions was
that "no government funds reached religious school's coffers." (citing Zobrest v.
Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 10 (1993)). The aid in question was either
providing instructors or materials); Agostini, 521 U.S. at 228-29.
While it is true that individual students may not directly apply
for Title I services, it does not follow from this premise that those
services are distributed "directly to the religious schools." (citation
omitted). In fact, they are not. No Title I funds ever reach the
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for the purposes of direct aid, it is presumptively impossible to
separate a pervasively sectarian institution from its religious
mission. If an institution is considered pervasively sectarian,
the government might be able to provide aid if the aid is in the
form of a non-cash grant (for example, secular textbooks or
computers).5 9 In a case where a plaintiff wants to challenge a
non-cash grant to a pervasively sectarian organization,
"plaintiffs must prove that the aid in question actually is, or has
been, used for religious purposes." 60 In other words, the Court
will not presume that the institution will use the non-cash grant
to directly promote their religious mission 61 nor will it presume
that the non-cash grant would free up institution funds making
it possible to spend more on promoting its religious
coffers of religious schools... Title I funds are instead distributed
to a public agency... that dispenses services directly to...
eligible students.
Id.
The view that government funds should never reach the coffers of pervasively
sectarian institutions can be considered the majority view of the Court at this time
since all the dissenters in Mitchell would certainly join Justices O'Connor and
Breyer on this narrow issue.
. 59 See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 840 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Nothing in this
record supports the proposition that all textbooks, whether they deal with
mathematics, physics, foreign languages, history or literature, are used by the
parochial schools to teach religion." (quoting Bd. of Educ. of Central Sch. Dist. No. 1
v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 248 (1968)). Also noting that the Court's approval of aid to
these pervasively sectarian institutions rested in part on the fact that the aid was
not of the nature of materials or instructors that could presumable be used to
advance a secular purpose. Direct funding is different). This can be considered the
Court's prevailing view since the plurality in Mitchell would join Justice O'Connor
on this point. Given the doctrine underlying aid to pervasively sectarian institutions
this is a controversial proposition. The only way to reconcile it with the courts
jurisprudence in this area is to conclude that a neutrally distributed non-cash grant
is less likely to be used for inculcation than direct funding would be.
60 Id. at 857 (Justice O'Connor preferred this test to the plurality approach. As
discussed above, given the political realities of the Court her narrower view is
essentially the majority view until Court composition changes).
61 See id. at 859.
When a religious school receives textbooks or instructional
materials and equipment lent with secular restrictions, the
school's teachers need not refrain from teaching religion
altogether. Rather, the instructors need only ensure that any such
religious teaching is done without the instructional aids provided
by the government. We have always been willing to assume that
religious school instructors can abide by such restrictions when
the aid consists of textbooks... The same assumption should
extend to instructional materials and equipment.
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mission.62Finally, if aid is dispersed to individual citizens to use
in the form of a voucher, for example, they probably can apply it
to secular services provided by a pervasively sectarian
institution since no one can seriously maintain that
governmental indoctrination occurs when an individual makes
the choice of where it is spent.63
In light of these guidelines, it seems clear that whether an
institution is pervasively sectarian or not is key to any
governmental indoctrination analysis.64 The cases indicate that
parochial schools are usually pervasively sectarian 65  but,
otherwise, the term is not clearly defined. 66 Aid necessarily
advances religion if it reaches an organization "in which religion
is so pervasive that a substantial portion of its functions are
subsumed in the religious mission."67 A pervasively sectarian
institution should not receive direct government aid because,
62 See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 229 (stating that the Court is "unwilling to presume
that the Board would violate Title I" by continuing to give aid to parochial schools
who accepted aid for remedial instruction and reduced the level of the parochial
school's funds expended for remedial instruction. If a school acted in such a way
they would likely be freeing up funds that could be used to further their religious
mission). The Court, however, will presume that a pervasively sectarian institution
is incapable of separating direct aid from its religious mission. Id. at 220-21.
63 See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 843 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that aid of
this type can't reasonably be interpreted as government endorsement of religion).
64 See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 620-21 (1988) (remanding the case for
lower court determination whether the affected institution were pervasively
sectarian); Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 109 Cal. Rptr.
2d 176, 202 (Cal. App. 4th 2001) (analyzing whether an institution was pervasively
sectarian in order to determine whether a law violated the Establishment Clause).
But see Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 827 (Thomas, J.) (noting that whether a recipient is
pervasively sectarian or not should not be part of the analysis. "[Tihe religious
nature of the recipient should not matter.., so long as the recipient adequately
furthers the government's secular purpose.").
65 See Bowen, 487 U.S. at 610-11 (distinguishing religiously affiliated
organizations that provided counseling services for adolescents from religiously
affiliated parochial schools); Id. at 631 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
The majority first skews the Establishment Clause analysis by
adopting a cramped view of what constitutes a pervasively
sectarian institution. Perhaps because most of the Court's
decisions in this area have come in the context of aid to parochial
schools, which traditionally have been characterized as
pervasively sectarian, the majority seems to equate the
characterization with the institution.
Id.*
66 Id. at 631 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ('Pervasively sectarian' [is] a vaguely
defined term of art").
67 Id. at 610 (quoting Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743 (1973)).
CHARITABLE CHOICE AND FAITH BASED INITIATIVE
even if it is designated for secular purposes, it may be used to
advance the religious mission and result in governmental
indoctrination. 68 It appears that the Court will not presume that
a religiously affiliated organization is pervasively sectarian 69
unless it is a parochial school. 70 It may seem curious that
government funds can't be given directly to student X's parochial
school but they can be given directly to student X's religiously
affiliated counselors. 71 Perhaps the distinction lies in the notion
that parochial schools have traditionally been fertile grounds for
inculcation.72 Since counseling services are not traditionally
considered fertile grounds for inculcation, 73 the Court is not
willing to presume there is an inextricable tie between the
services and the religious institution's mission until it is proved
otherwise. 74
68 Id. (Rehnquist, J.) ("The reason for this is that there is a risk that direct
government funding, even if it is designated for specific secular purposes, may
nonetheless advance the pervasively sectarian institutions 'religious mission."').
69 See Bowen, 487 U.S. at 621 (on remand Plaintiffs needed to show that the
religiously affiliated counseling providers were pervasively sectarian "such as we
have held parochial schools to be." This was to be considered on a case by case basis
since the statute was not unconstitutional on its face); see also id. at 623 (O'Connor,
J., concurring) (noting that on remand, "extensive violations - if they can be proved
in this case - will be highly relevant in shaping an appropriate remedy that ends
such abuses.").
70 See Bowen, 487 U.S. at 610-11 (noting that the cases hold that parochial
schools are pervasively sectarian. Then noting that a religiously affiliated provider
of counseling services for adolescents are not parochial schools so they are not
necessarily pervasively sectarian).
71 Id. This inference is drawn from the fact that in Bowen the Court noted
parochial schools are pervasively sectarian but held that religiously affiliated
adolescent counseling services were not necessarily pervasively sectarian. Id.
72 See id. at 610-11 (noting Congress cant pass a law that, on its face, directly
benefits only, or almost exclusively, parochial schools since aid to those schools
would have the impermissible effect of advancing religion by aiding the institution
religious mission which includes inculcation); see also DeStefano v. Emergency
Housing Group, Inc., 247 F.3d 397, 414 (2d Cir. 2001) ("To 'inculcate' is '[t]o impress
[something] upon the mind of another by frequent instruction or repetition; to
instill."') (quoting American Heritage Dictionary).
73 Certainly, any forum can become one for inculcation. However, it is usually
fair to say that these types of counseling services aren't provided to expand an
institution's religious base; they are provided to help individuals in need.
74 See Bowen, 487 U.S. at 612 ("[Njothing in our prior cases warrants the
presumption... that religiously affiliated... grantees are not capable of carrying
out their functions.. . in a lawful, secular manner.").
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B. Neutrality
Neutrality is an essential element of the second prong of the
Lemon-Agostini impermissible effect test,75 which asks whether
recipients are defined by reference to religion. It has long been
recognized that the government needs to remain neutral towards
religion. 76 The government may not set up a church 7 nor may it
aid or impede religious exercise. 78 Neutrality, however, does not
prohibit a government from providing religious institutions with
police and fire protection, textbooks, and other non-sectarian
aid 79 as long as that aid is dispersed in an evenhanded fashion.80
When an aid program is open to sectarian and non-sectarian
recipients, like a law that provides benefits to all students, it is
more likely to be considered neutral8l but this does not end the
Constitutional analysis.82
75 See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 838-39 (2000) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(noting that neutrality is important but only part of the analysis).
[I]n Agostini, neutrality was only one of several factors we
considered... Indeed given that the aid in Agostini had secular
content and was distributed on the basis of wholly neutral
criteria, our consideration of additional factors demonstrates that
the plurality's rule does not describe our recent Establishment
Clause jurisprudence.
Id. at 839.
76 See id. at 874 (Souter, J., dissenting). Note that in her concurring opinion in
Mitchell, Justice O'Connor specifically adopted Justice Souter's interpretation of the
issue of neutrality in the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Id. at 839
(O'Connor, J., concurring). Accordingly, Justice Souter's view is the majority view.
77 Id. at 873-74 (Souter, J., dissenting).
78 Id. at 877 ("Government must maintain neutrality as to religion, 'neutrality'
being a conclusory label for the required position of government as neither aiding
religion nor impeding religious exercise by believers.").
79 Id. at 879-80 (noting that court developed a "distinction between 'religious'
and 'secular' benefits." The Court recognized that religious institutions were
entitled to police and fire department protection because this aid only incidentally
advanced religion if at all). Id. Then the Courts began to recognize grants of
instructional aids like secular text books or translators were acceptably neutral aid.
80 Id. at 882-83 (noting that once the secular and religious benefit distinction
came to being the Court added further meaning to neutrality in this area by
requiring allocation of aid on an evenhanded basis to religious and secular
recipients).
81 See id. at 882 (noting that "the Court adopted the redefinition of neutrality as
evenhandedness" (citing Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 380 (1983))).
82 Id. at 839 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[W]e have never held that a
government-aid program passes constitutional muster solely because of the neutral
it employs as a basis for distributing aid."); id. at 876 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Evenhandedness of distribution as between religious and secular
beneficiaries is a relevant factor, but not a sufficiency test of
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In order to satisfy the second prong, a funding program that
defines its recipients by religion is unconstitutional on its face.8 3
Funds must be distributed using "wholly neutral and secular
criteria .... "84 What logically follows is that once a religiously
affiliated organization accepts government funding for a social
welfare program, it cannot limit enrollment to members of its
religion.8 5 If it were to do so, the funding provision, while not
unconstitutional on its face, would have the unconstitutional
effect of promoting indoctrination into a particular religion.
However, an institution that does limit enrollment to members
of its religion may still be eligible to participate in a voucher, or
true choice aid program. 86
constitutionality. There is no rule of religious equal protection to
the effect that any expenditure for the benefit of religious school
students is necessarily constitutional so long as public school
pupils are favored on ostensibly identical terms.
Id. at 877. But see id. at 809 (Thomas, J., for the plurality):
If the religious, irreligious, and areligious are all alike eligible for
governmental aid, no one would conclude that any indoctrination
that any recipient conducts has been done at the behest of the
government... if the government, seeking to further some
legitimate secular purpose, offers aid on the same terms, without
regard to religion, to all who adequately further the purpose ...
then it is fair to say that any aid going to a religious recipient only
has the effect of furthering that secular purpose.
Id. at 809-10.
83 See id. at 846 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that a statute may not
disburse funding be reference to religion because this would promote indoctrination
into the religion eligible for the aid).
84 Id.
85 The Justices refer to this type of funding as a per-capita aid program as
opposed to a true private choice aid program. See id. at 842-43 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). Justice O'Connor felt that the distinction was important because if an
institution were pervasively sectarian, government funds should not reach its
coffers although it may be eligible for true private choice aid programs. Id. at 843.
This distinction is important for endorsement reasons. Id. at 842-43. Therefore, if
an organization accepts a direct grant, clearly it can't limit enrollment to members
of its religion because that would create an incentive to undergo indoctrination that
was created by government funding. However, if an individual were exercising a
true private choice, presumably no indoctrination or endorsement issue would arise.
86 See id. When government funding is provided directly to religious schools, "it
is reasonable to say that the government has communicated a message of
endorsement if the school uses those funds to inculcate religion in its students ......
Id. at 843. On the other hand, under a "true private-choice program," the
government funds support religious school only to the extent of "independent
decisions made by numerous individuals" to attend such a school - therefore there
are no endorsement implications for the government. Id. at 842-43.
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C. Excessive Entanglement
A funding program fails the third prong of the Lemon-
Agostini test if it results in an excessive entanglement with
religion.8 7  This does not mean any entanglement raises
constitutional issues because "[i]nteraction between church and
state is inevitable."88  The Court has drastically relaxed this
standard in modern Establishment Clause jurisprudence. While
it once considered whether a funding program would result in
political divisiveness, or require cooperation between
government entities and sectarian institutions, these factors are
no longer dispositive.8 9 Now the most significant part of the
analysis is whether the program requires or results in "pervasive
monitoring by public authorities. '"90 Since the Court will no
longer presume that religiously affiliated organizations will not
use government funds to lawfully further the government's
secular objectives, 9' this requirement has been stripped of much
of its force.92 In Bowen v. Kendrick,93 the Court held that there
was no excessive entanglement when the funding provision
87 See Agostim v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 233 (1997) (noting that excessive
entanglement has always be considered because government intrusion has the
impermissible effect of inhibiting religion).
88 Id.
89 Previously, the Court considered three areas in an excessive entanglement
analysis:
(i)[Whether] the program would require "pervasive monitoring by
public authorities" to ensure that Title I employees did not
inculcate religion; (ii) [Whether] the program required
"administrative cooperation" between the Board and parochial
schools; and (iii) [whether] the program might increase the
dangers of "political divisiveness" (citation omitted). Under our
current understanding of the Establishment Clause, the last two
considerations are insufficient by themselves to create an
"excessive" entanglement.
Id. 233-34.
90 Id. at 233.
91 See id. at 234 ("[We have abandoned the assumption that properly
instructed public employees will fail to discharge their duties faithfully."); Bowen v.
Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 612 (1988) ("[Nothing in our prior cases warrants the
presumption.., that religiously affiliated ... grantees are not capable of carrying
out their functions under the [funding program] in a lawful, secular manner.").
92 See Agostini, 521 at 234 (noting that the assumption underlying the former
pervasive monitoring analysis has been "undermined .... Since we have abandoned
the assumption that properly instructed public employees will fail to discharge their
duties faithfully, we must discard the assumption that pervasive monitoring. .. is
required.").
93 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
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allowed the implementing agency to review the recipient's
program and materials as well as conduct periodic visits. 94 The
Court has also upheld the constitutionality of audits of
religiously affiliated recipients to ensure that grants are not
being used to further the institution's religious mission.95
This prong provides no great barriers to drafting
appropriate legislation. Legislators can essentially treat a
religiously affiliated funding recipient much as they would any
other grantee for the purposes of monitoring without creating an
excessive entanglement on the face of the provision. However, it
is not hard to imagine excessive entanglements arising in
practice. An excessive entanglement could arise from prolonged
litigation brought by, or on behalf of,96 the government against a
religious organization.9 7  Litigation may arise over disputes
regarding whether religious recipients should be subject to
conditions placed upon funding which happen to clash with a
particular institution's religious beliefs. 98 While the issue is
94 See id. at 616-17.
Unquestionably, the Secretary will review the programs set up
and run by the... grantees, and undoubtedly this will involve a
review of, for example, the educational materials that a grantee
proposes to use. The Secretary may also wish to have Government
employees visit the clinics or offices where ... programs are being
carried out to see whether they are in fact being administered in
accordance with statutory and constitutional requirements. But in
our view, this type of grant monitoring does not amount to
"excessive entanglement."
Id. See also Agostini, 521 U.S. at 234 ("[W]e have not found excessive entanglement
in cases in which States imposed far more onerous burdens on religious institutions
than the monitoring system at issue here.").
95 See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 233 (citing Roemer v. Board of Public Works of Md.,
426 U.S. 736, 764-765 (1976) for the proposition that there is "no excessive
entanglement where State conducts annual audits to ensure that categorical state
grants to religious colleges are not used to teach religion.").
96 If a private citizen were to take advantage of a private right of action
contained within a Federal Statute and act as a private attorney general for
instance.
97 See Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 109 Cal. Rptr.
2d 176, 204-05 (citing E.E.O.C. v. Catholic Univ. of America, 83 F.3d 455, 465 (D.C.
Cir. 1996) ("[C]ourts have found an unconstitutional entanglement with religion in
situations where a 'protracted legal process pit[s] church and states as
adversaries,'... and where the Government is placed in a position among
competing religious visions.').
98 See generally Frank Bruni and Elizabeth Becker, Charity Is Told It Must
Abide By Antidiscrimination Laws, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2001, at A15 (reporting
that the Salvation Army asked that charitable institutions be exempt from law that
bar hiring discrimination against homosexuals but their request was denied).
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beyond the scope of this article, it would seem that any
institution that could not square its secular organizations with
discrimination laws would be considered pervasively sectarian
and thus ineligible for direct funding, 99 but not other forms of
aid.
II. CURRENT APPLICATION OF LEMON-AGOSTINIIN THE SECOND
CIRCUIT
DeStefano v. Emergency Housing Group, Inc.,100 a case
coming out of the Second Circuit in the wake of Mitchell, is an
excellent example of an up to date application of the Lemon-
Agostini test. DeStefano challenged state funding of an alcohol
treatment facility on the grounds that it included Alcoholics
Anonymous (A.A.) in its treatment program.10' The treatment
facility was almost entirely funded by the State10 2 but, it is
important to note for our analysis, the facility was completely
separate from A.A., which received no funds. 10 3 The court found
that despite the fact that membership in A.A. is not conditioned
upon any religious background or accepting any religion, 04 and
the organization expressly rejects any ties to any religious
99 See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 232 ("[T]o assess entanglement, we have looked to
'the character and purposes of the institutions that are benefited'). This article
asserts that that statement sounds, at least in part, similar to a pervasively
sectarian analysis. In Bowen, the court noted that some institutions cannot separate
their religious mission from their secular mission. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 610. This
would seem to be the case where because of religious beliefs an institution could not
abide by Spending Clause conditions when carrying out secular programs. However,
the Court will not presume a religiously affiliated institution is incapable of
separating its religious mission from its secular one as far as might be necessary for
compliance. "[N]othing in our prior cases warrants the presumption.., that
religiously affiliated grantees are not capable of carrying out their functions.., in a
lawful, secular manner." Id. at 612. While this makes it easier for lawmakers to
funnel funds to religiously affiliated organizations, it also seems to invite lawsuits
from individuals who want particular organizations labeled pervasively sectarian.
100 247 F.3d 397 (2d. Cir. 2001).
101 Id. at 402 (outlining the facilities program, which included counseling,
educational films, assessments, "rap groups," and strongly suggests participation in
A.A.).
102 Id. at 403 (noting that the facility received 95% of its funding from N.Y.
State).
103 Id. at 416 ("A.A. itself does not receive State funding either directly... or
derivatively").
104 See id. at 423 ("A.A.'s potential members are not humankind in general, but
a particular group of afflicted persons who are dispersed, both geographically and
socially.").
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organization, 105 precedent required a finding that the A.A.
program was a religious activity because members engaged in a
group prayer at the end of meetings, and A.A. literature
contained many references to God and spiritual practices.1 06
Therefore, the court had to interpret Establishment Clause
jurisprudence 10 7 and determine what the appropriate role was
for an arguably religious approach to a secular problem 08 when
direct government funding is involved.109
The court found that the State's attempt to fight alcohol
abuse was a valid secular purpose. 10 It then rejected Plaintiffs
argument that the mere appearance of union between the state
funded facility and a religious organization amounted to
endorsement, recognizing that the Court's approach to this area
has changed.' The court went on to apply the Lemon-Agostini
effect test:1 12 It took the second prong first, finding that the
funding program did not define "recipients by reference to
religion" since there was nothing to indicate the State favored
facilities that incorporated A.A. 1 3  It then noted that the
program passed the third prong of the test" 4 since the State only
needed to engage in limited oversight to ensure funds were spent
correctly." 5
105 See id. at 417 ("That A.A. is not a traditional form of religious worship and
seems to encompass a wide range of monotheistic beliefs does not effect the
calculus.").
106 See id. at 406 (noting the court's previous decision to this effect in Warner v.
Orange County Dep't of Prob., 115 F.3d 1068 (2d Cir. 1997)).
107 Id. at 408 ("Our conclusions that the A.A. program is religious activity under
our case law ... require us to assess the merits of DeStefano's assertions under the
First Amendment.").
108 See id. at 413 ("There can be little doubt that New York State is spending
money principally to fight alcohol abuse, not to promote religion.").
109 See id. at 419 (noting that the program involved "direct public funding" and
that was an important distinction).
110 Id. at 413 (recognizing that the parties did not dispute this).
M" See id. at 411 ("We read these decisions as casting doubt on the vitality of
the endorsement test as a stand-alone measure of constitutionality in most
Establishment Clause cases." The court noted that it would still be dispositive
where a governmental entity "embraces a religious symbol").
112 Id. at 413.
113 Id. at 414.
114 Id. ("Nothing in the record before us suggests that [the State] distributes
state funds in a discriminatory manner favoring religious approaches in general or
A.A. in particular.").
115 See id. at 414 ("[T]he State must keep an eye on the activities that are
supported by the funding. This alone is not necessarily excessive entanglement.").
The court also noted this program required very limited oversight and was well
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The Second Circuit went on to address governmental
indoctrination and noted that it is not enough that some
indoctrination have had occurred; rather, the alleged
indoctrination must be attributable to the government. 116 The
court held that it was appropriate to allow A.A. members to hold
regular A.A. meetings in the facility's day room that patients
could attend, 117 but the court noted the facility could not require
patients to attend these meetings as a condition to remaining at
the facility. 118 A.A. literature and videos could be made available
to patients in a facility library 1 9 but patients could not be
required to read literature or watch the videos.' 20 The court
noted that on these points the voluntary nature of the activities
was the "fulcrum" of the inquiry, 121 and since A.A. received no
State funding, their representatives could essentially do and say
what they liked.122 Since staff members were paid almost
entirely with State funds, the issue of their activities was more
troublesome. 123 The court found that staff members could urge
patients to attend A.A. meetings, even properly engage in
within Supreme Court parameters. Id.
116 Id. at 414 (citing Agostini for the proposition that even if indoctrination
occurs it must be "attributable to the government" in order to be unconstitutional).
117 Id. at 408 (holding that "employment of a treatment approach in which
independently led A.A. meetings play a substantial role" does not offend the
Establishment Clause when facility was directly funded by the government).
118 See id. at 413 (noting that if the facility forced patients to attend the
meetings there would be a constitutional problem, however, Plaintiff had previously
withdrawn all allegations of coercion).
119 Id. at 408 (holding that the facilities practice of making A.A. literature and
videos available to patients was appropriate).
120 See id. (holding that staff couldn't require patients to watch A.A. related
videos).
121 Id. at 412 ("The fulcrum of this inquiry, we think, is individual conscience
and free will.").
122 See id. at 416. Since A.A. had no financial ties to the government, even if
patients accepted the suggested A.A. recovery program, this indoctrination could not
reasonably be attributed to the government since their decision to attend A.A. was
voluntary.
123 See id. at 416 ("Direct state funding of persons who actively inculcate
religious beliefs crosses the vague but palpable line between permissible and
impermissible government action."). The Second Circuit explicitly rejected the
Mitchell plurality's view that neutral administration of a funding program was all
the constitution required and adopted Justice O'Connor's position. Id. at 419. In
other words, if a organization receives direct funds and then engages in inculcation,
that indoctrination could reasonably be attributed to the government. If the aid
weren't direct, as in the case of vouchers or non-cash grants, the aid is less likely to
be reasonably perceived as governmental indoctrination.
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persuasion and providing other encouragement. 124 The staff
could not, however, read to patients from the A.A. literature nor
could they supervise A.A. meetings. 125 The DeStefano court also
recognized that the issue might have turned out differently if the
patient had engaged in a true private choice and selected,
possibly by submitting a voucher or using Medicaid benefits, a
facility that incorporated mandatory A.A. over one that did
not.126 However, the facility in DeStefano was directly funded
and that was essential to the analysis. 127
III. EXPANSION OF CHARITABLE CHOICE AND THE CARE ACT ARE
PERMISSIBLE
In light of the above analysis of current Establishment
Clause jurisprudence, it should be clear that a government
funding provision, if drafted properly, will not offend the
Establishment Clause for providing aid to religiously affiliated
organizations that further a legitimate secular purpose. Both
Expansion of Charitable Choice 128 and the CARE Act 129 (the
Acts) pass constitutional muster.
The purpose of the Acts is "to enable assistance to be
provided to individuals and families in need in the most effective
124 See id. at 410. The court went on to explain that:
[U]rging people to attend or explaining to them why, in the view
of the speaker, it is in their best interests to attend A.A. sessions
is not, without more, indoctrination. It does not imbue clients
with A.A.'s point of view, nor does it inculcate or "impress [A.A.
beliefs] upon the mind of the listener by frequent instruction or
repetition."
Id. at 415.
125 Id. at 408 (holding that staff could not properly engage in nightly readings of
A.A. literature nor could it supervise A.A. meetings). Since the staff is essentially
directly paid for by the government, these activities could reasonably be construed
as government indoctrination.
126 See id. at 413. In this case, a patient had no state sponsored alternative to
the care provided in the facility. If the patient had had a choice between a facility
that required attendance at A.A. meetings and one that did not, the facility might
be allowed to condition admission to the facility upon said attendance. There would
be free choice, but the choice between treatment and no treatment is no choice at
all. Id.
127 See id. at 416 (comparing DeStefano to the Court's decision in Agostini
where the State's funding did not result in governmental indoctrination); see also
supra note 117.
128 Community Solutions Act of 2001, H.R. 7, 107th Cong. (2001).
129 Charity Aid, Recovery and Empowerment Act of 2002, S. 1924, 107th Cong.
(2002).
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and efficient manner."130 The Acts further define their secular
purposes by listing specific types of programs to be addressed: 131
juvenile delinquency, aid to children who have a parent in
prison, housing assistance, and hunger relief are just a few areas
listed.13 2 In order to ensure that the program does not result in
governmental indoctrination, the House version provides that
"[n]o funds provided through a grant or cooperative agreement to
a religious organization.., shall be expended for sectarian
instruction, worship, or proselytization. If the religious
organization offers such an activity it shall be voluntary for the
individuals receiving services .... ,"133 Since there is no
presumption that religiously affiliated organizations will ignore
the statutory mandate, there is no reason to presume
governmental indoctrination will occur. 134
On the second prong of the test, it becomes important to note
that Charitable Choice has never defined its recipients by
reference to religion; 13 5 it merely allows religious institutions to
compete for government funds "on the same basis as other
nongovernmental organizations."'136 Expansion of Charitable
Choice also requires that grantees, whether receiving direct or
indirect aid (i.e., vouchers), cannot require recipients of their
services be of, or join, their religion. 37 This provision may go
beyond constitutional protections required by current
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. It would certainly work to
130 Community Solutions Act of 2001, H.R. 7, 107th Cong. at § 1991(b)(1).
131 Community Solutions Act of 2001, H.R. 7, 107th Cong. at § 1991(c)(4)
(defining "PROGRAMS- For the purposes of this section"); CARE Act of 2002 S.
1924 107th Cong. (noting that purpose is "[tlo promote charitable giving and other
purposes").
132 Community Solutions Act of 2001, H.R. 7, 107th Cong. at § 1991(c)(4) (listing
multiple types of aid that will be considered a program under section 1991); CARE
Act of 2002 S. 1924 107th Cong. at § 301(e)(2)(A)(ii)(listing the same).
133 Community Solutions Act of 2001, H.R. 7, 107th Cong. at § 1991(j). The
Senate version does not include this limitation but it is implicit since this is merely
a restatement of the Court's position on this point.
134 See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 612 (1988) ("[N]othing in our prior
cases warrants the presumption ... that religiously affiliated... grantees are not
capable of carrying out their functions ... in a lawful secular manner.").
135 See 42 U.S.C. § 604a(c) ("[R]eligious organizations are eligible, on the same
basis as any other private organization, as contractors to provide assistance.").
136 Community Solutions Act of 2001, H.R. 7, 107th Cong. at § 1991(c)(1)(A)
(2001).
137 Id. at § 1991(h)(2) ("A religious organization providing assistance [through
direct or indirect aid program] ... shall not deny an individual... admission on the
basis of religion, a religious belief, or refusal to hold a religious belief.")
230
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safeguard against governmental aid having the unintended
effect of providing an incentive to join a particular religion. 38
Under these Acts, religiously affiliated organizations shall
be accountable in much the same manner that other
nongovernmental recipients are. 139 The House version is very
specific on this matter: recipients of direct aid can keep the aid
in an account separate from the religious operations and only
that account will be audited.140 Recipients of indirect assistance
may keep the aid in a separate account, and, if they do, only that
account will be audited. 141 Religiously affiliated recipients will
also complete an annual self-audit to assess statutory
compliance. 142
The CARE Act treats all nongovernmental social welfare
providers the same and does not list specific auditing safeguards.
This is constitutionally permissible. Since there is no
presumption religiously affiliated providers will flout statutory
mandates, there is no need to engage in pervasive monitoring of
affiliated providers. 143 Therefore, both Acts provide for some
modest oversight and, as a result, do not result in an excessive
entanglement.
IV. THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S BROADER PROPOSALS ARE
ALSO PERMISSIBLE
President Bush championed Expansion of Charitable Choice
because the original provision applied to "only a small portion of
138 See supra note 86 and accompanying text. Under Justice O'Connor's analysis
in Mitchell, it appears that even if an organization requires participants to be of a
specific religion it may be eligible to participate in true individual choice programs
or receive non-cash grants. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 842 (2000) (O'Connor
concurring). This would not stop Congress from conditioning participation upon
non-discrimination.
139 Community Solutions Act of 2001, H.R. 7, 107th Cong. at § 1991(i)(1)
("Except as provided.., a religious organization providing assistance under any
program ... shall be subject to the same regulations as other nongovernmental
organizations to account."); CARE Act of 2002, S. 1924 107th Cong. § 301(c)(2).
140 Community Solutions Act of 2001 H.R. 7 107th Cong. § 1991(i)(2)(A).
141 Id. at § 1991(i)(2)(B).
142 Id. at § 1991(i)(2)(C).
143 See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 234 (1997) (noting that since the
presumption that merely placing a public employee in a sectarian environment
results in governmental indoctrination had been abandoned so to must the
presumption that a program placing public employees in a sectarian environment
requires pervasive monitoring).
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Federal social spending."144 In addition to pushing the bill
through Congress, the Bush Administration promises to use the
powers of the executive to "realign Federal policy and programs
to better use, empower, and collaborate with.., faith-based and
other community serving groups that have traditionally been
distant from our government."' 145 It will do so by identifying
"Federal rules and practices" that act as barriers to aid for such
groups and "propose regulatory and statutory relief' to remove
them. 146  It will also encourage individual State executive
branches to engage in the same process. 147
The Bush Administration also proposes to initiate "test
partnerships between the Federal Government and faith-based
and grassroots groups to serve particular needs."'148 These
particular needs include funding of "services reaching the
children of prisoners," like mentoring conducted by religiously
affiliated groups, and a program that prepares inmates for
reentry to society. 49 They also include funding of after school
programs run by religiously affiliated groups and "maternity
group homes," although it doesn't define exactly what type of
services would be provided by the specific homes. 50
The President's proposals do not threaten any more violence
to the Establishment Clause than do the Charitable Choice
provisions that came before him; he merely seeks to use the
executive branch to make the legislation more effective. The
only thing remotely troublesome about the Bush
Administration's policy is that it arguably indicates a preference
for faith-based solutions.' 5 ' However, the Administration is
careful to point out that they are singling out faith-based and
community based organizations "not because of favoritism...
but because they typically have been.., excluded in Federal
policy."'1 2 The Administration's stated purpose is to ensure that
social welfare programs work as effectively as possible and that
144 Rallying the Armies of Compassion, supra note 2.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id. One probably wouldn't argue that these are noble pursuits.
151 See id. (noting, somewhat defensively, that it mentions "faith-based and
other community-serving groups" by name not out of "favoritism").
152 Id.
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the best way to do this is encourage participation from
organizations that have traditionally been discriminated against
in public subsidy schemes. 53 While some may question the Bush
Administration's motives, 54 one can't deny that their argument
is a reasonable one and, on its face, it poses no constitutional
issues. 155
V. POTENTIAL DANGERS THAT MAY ARISE IN APPLICATION OF THE
FAITH-BASED INITIATIVES AND How THEY MIGHT BE ADDRESSED
While Expansion of Charitable Choice and the President's
wider proposals are facially permissible, problems may arise in
application. These problems are not threats to the government's
social welfare programs; rather, they are threats to the
religiously affiliated institutions that endeavor to become
government funded social service providers. More safeguards
should be given to these institutions.
Neither bill gives religiously affiliated providers an
exemption from most statutory non-discrimination provisions.'5 6
This makes it more likely that religiously affiliated organizations
could be sued under federal statutes, either by or on behalf of the
government, which could amount to an excessive
153 Id.
These quiet heroes lift people's lives in ways that are beyond
government's know-how, usually on shoestring budgets, and they
heal our nations ills one heart and one act of kindness at a
time .... Private and charitable groups, including religious ones,
should have the fullest opportunity permitted by law to compete
on a level playing field, so long as they achieve valid public
purposes, like curbing crime, conquering addiction, strengthening
families, and overcoming poverty .... Our aim is equal
opportunity for such groups.
Id.
154 See Newman, supra note 2 and accompanying text.
155 See Rallying the Armies of Compassion, supra note 2. (the Administration
does not endorse one religion nor even religious organizations in general since it
promises to help "grassroots and other non profit groups" including "faith-based and
community serving groups").
156 See Community Solutions Act of 2001, H.R. 7, 107th Cong. at § 1991(f)
("Nothing in this section shall alter the duty of a religious organization receiving
assistance or providing services ... to comply with... non-discrimination
provisions."). But see id. at § 1991(e) (providing that religious organizations
exemption under 42 U.S.C. 2000e-1 is not effected). Religious organizations are still
allowed to hire only members of its religion.
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entanglement. 5 7  One solution to this problem would be to
provide a broader exemption from non-discrimination provisions
to religiously affiliated providers. 58 Perhaps a more politically
acceptable solution would be to provide an administrative forum
where any violation could be decided in an eligibility review. l5 9
If a violation could be found, future aid would be conditioned
upon taking steps to end the discriminatory practice. If these
administrative decisions were only subject to limited review, and
the only remedy were a conditional end of funding, the threat of
an excessive entanglement arising might be greatly reduced.
The religiously affiliated institutions also need clear
answers on what is permissible and impermissible. The White
House Office of Faith and Community Based Initiatives needs to
give potential recipients clear guidelines explaining exactly what
is expected of them, and these guidelines need to be reviewed by
constitutional experts. 160
VI. FROM THE AFFILIATED ORGANIZATION'S PERSPECTIVE
Any institution considering whether to apply for a grant
must first consider the implications. The experience of the Red
Cross, which was severely criticized after September eleventh for
its alleged failure to spend funds as promised, demonstrates that
when a charity enters a field traditionally controlled by
government, it will be analyzed under a microscope. A faith-
based organization probably wants none of this scrutiny unless
there is a very good reason for submitting to it.
A faith-based organization might decide that the only
157 See Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 109 Cal. Rptr.
2d 176, 204-05 (citing E.E.O.C. v. Catholic University of America, 83 F.3d 455, 465
(D.C. Cir. 1996). "[Clourts have found an unconstitutional entanglement with
religion in situations where a 'protracted legal process pits church and states as
adversaries,' ... and where the government is placed in a position of choosing
among 'competing religious visions."').
158 See Bruni and Becker, supra note 97 (noting that religiously affiliated
charities asked the house for a broader exemption).
159 Whether the Government could limit this type of eligibility review to faith-
based organizations is another issue beyond the scope of this article. It would seem
that such a distinction could pass strict scrutiny since the Government has a
compelling interest in avoiding Establishment Clause violations.
160 In its current form, Expansion of Charitable Choice allows for some
"training an technical assistance" for small nongovernmental organizations."
Community Solutions Act of 2001, H.R. 7, 107th Cong. at § 1991(o).
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legitimate reason for submitting to such scrutiny is if the
organization can provide the welfare service more effectively
than traditional providers because of its faith-based approach. If
that is the case and a religiously affiliated institution could not
apply their faith to the social evil they are asked to address
because of Establishment Clause concerns, there would be no
reason for the organization to accept government funding in the
first place.
But even if the faith-based organization can provide the
service within the confines of the Establishment Clause, every
organization should do a benefit-burden analysis before
accepting funds. When considering a direct grant, an institution
must understand that the staff' 61 implementing the secular
program cannot engage in indoctrination or inculcation. 162 The
staff may urge the client to volunteer to engage in indoctrination
provided by the institution's church, and even give persuasive
reasons why the client should attend indoctrination, 163 but
simple activities like staff led prayer in such facilities would
probably not be permissible. 164 Providing a religious library
would be acceptable,' 65 and it's likely that church volunteers
could enter a facility to provide indoctrination but clients could
not be required or coerced to participate. 66
161 It is not entirely clear whether voluntary staff are treated the same as paid
staff. This article would suggest that a religiously affiliate institution would treat
them as one in the same. However, if a volunteer is not carrying out staff activities
they should not be part of the staff and thus could be treated differently.
162 See DeStefano v. Emergency Housing Group, Inc., 247 F.3d 397, 416 (2d Cir.
2001) ("Direct state funding of persons who actively inculcate religious beliefs
crosses the vague but palpable line between permissible and impermissible
government action."); see also supra note 117 and accompanying text.
163 See DeStefano, 247 F.3d at 415 ("Urging people to attend [indoctrination] or
explaining to them why, in the view of the speaker, it is in their best interest to
attend.., is not, without more, indoctrination.").
164 See id. at 408. The staff could not read to patients from what was arguably
religious literature. Id. It follows that the staff would also be restricted from
leading clients in prayer sessions. However, nothing suggests a true volunteer could
not lead prayers as long as they were voluntary in nature.
165 See id. at 421 (holding that facility could maintain a library of arguably
religious materials an make them available to clients).
166 In DeStefano, members of A.A. could enter the institution and hold
meetings. Id. at 416. However, it may be possible to distinguish that case from the
case of the treatment center run by a church since A.A. had no affiliation with the
institution in DeStefano However, the distinction doesn't seem important since the
voluntary nature of the activities was the "fulcrum" of the analysis, not the lack of
financial ties. Id. at 412.
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When an institution decides to accept vouchers or other
forms of indirect aid, it may be able to engage in more direct
indoctrination but it must not define eligibility by reference to
religion. 167  The institution should recognize that greater
participation in this area could be accompanied by increased
exposure to litigation. There is also a risk that religious
organizations could become scapegoats when things go awry: If
the public begins to expect social welfare services from religious
institutions and they can't oblige because, for whatever reason,
nobody ever gave them any real aid, who will be blamed? After
weighing these considerations, each organization must assess
whether they can provide real help in light of potential dilution
of their message.
CONCLUSION
Expansion of Charitable Choice and the Bush
Administration's wider proposals do not violate the Court's
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. They may result in
constitutional and practical problems in application but these
could be greatly reduced if Congress provides religiously
affiliated social service providers more statutory safeguards like
greater exemptions from non-discrimination provisions or an
administrative remedy to settle disputes that arise.
There is no doubt that faith-based approaches are often the
most effective ways to address addiction, homelessness, teen
pregnancy, and other social ills. The only doubt that arises is
whether governmental and constitutional restrictions will allow
faith-based recipients to bring that faith to bear on the social
problem they are asked to address. The Court's modern
Establishment Clause jurisprudence makes it clear that the
Constitution does not prevent government funding of social
welfare providers as long as the funds are not used to advance
religion. Policy makers should recognize this as another arrow
in their quiver and encourage funding where it is appropriate
and advantageous to do so. Before accepting these funds, faith-
based organizations should familiarize themselves with the law
in this area and the attendant risks and determine whether they
can still act effectively to address the social ill in question.
167 See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
